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INTRODUCTION

Today foreign investors have a new and powerful weapon to challenge
denial of justice. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) require "fair and
equitable treatment" consistent with customary international law, including
"the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative
adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process
embodied in the principal legal systems of the world."' Those treaties also

* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. J.D. New York University; LL.M. University of
Edinburgh. The research assistance of Brendan P. Geary is greatly appreciated. The article was
submitted as part of the Virginia journal of International Law's addressing "Conflicts of Interest.
Resolving Differences in Global Legal Norms" in Charlottesville, Virginia on February 10, 2012.
Comments and questions from Peter "Bo" Rutledge, Donald "Trey" Childress, Ken Anderson, Doug
Cassel, Jay Tidmarsh, Paolo Carozza, Mary Ellen O'Connell, Paul Dubinsky, Gregory Fox, Charles
"Chip" Brower, and Paul Stephan are gratefully acknowledged.
1. See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) art. 10.5,
Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://tinyurl.com/azavmvp (last visited Apr. 20, 2012); United States-
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create a private right of action, empowering investors with the right to
initiate international arbitral proceedings directly against the host state.
Thus, BITs provide the substance and the means for the effective review
of judicial behavior.
These treaties do not stand alone. They are part of an elaborate system
of international scrutiny of national courts. A key emerging component of
this system is ancillary discovery to prove denial of justice. Pursuant to
these bilateral investment treaties, international tribunals sit in judgment
on domestic judicial misconduct; and pursuant to federal law, federal
courts assist in the discovery of such misconduct. Far from deferring to
the judicial acts of other sovereigns, federal courts are the handmaiden of
international tribunals, adjudicating foreign judicial misconduct, and
unearthing evidence that would be impossible to discover otherwise.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews international law
standards with respect to denial of justice, and surveys the use of
investment arbitration to enforce that law. While denial of justice has a
long pedigree, the proliferation of investment arbitrations pursuant to
BITs provides an effective vehicle to adjudicate such misconduct.
Sovereigns now vest international tribunals with the power to sit in
judgment on their domestic courts.
In Part II, the article explores the burgeoning trend of pursuing ancillary
discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to aid international tribunals. As one
court put it, Section 1782 "creates an ancillary remedy to further the just
resolution of litigations and arbitrations in other fora." 2 Federal courts
uniformly agree that Section 1782 applies to investment arbitration and
they routinely order liberal, American-style discovery in aid of such
international proceedings.
Part III presents the ongoing dispute between Chevron and Ecuador as
a paradigmatic example of the use of ancillary discovery to prove denial of
justice. Section 1782 proceedings have resulted in at least fifty orders and
opinions from federal courts across the country. The ability to request
ancillary discovery has proven essential to Chevron's denial of justice
claims. Chevron has procured virtually all of the key evidence in support
of its allegations through Section 1782 discovery.
Finally, Part IV addresses several implications regarding the use of
ancillary discovery to prove denial of justice. These conclusions are that:
(1) the use of Section 1782 in aid of international tribunals reflects
sensitivity to the comity of courts, not the comity of nations, such that
federal courts determining whether to order ancillary discovery should
Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 5, Nov. 4, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 268; United States-Rwanda
Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 6(5), Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY Doc No. 110-23.
2. In re Application of Chevron Corp. (Berknger), 709 F.Supp.2d 283, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) affd
Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cit. 2011).
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consider the international tribunal's receptivity to such assistance, but not
the attitude of the foreign sovereign responding to allegations of
international law violations; (2) Section 1782 reflects a congressional intent
to allow interested parties to avail themselves of liberal discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in the indirect incorporation of
American-style discovery into international proceedings; (3) liberal
discovery pursuant to Section 1782 promotes evidentiary forum shopping,
encouraging parties to pursue ancillary discovery in the United States
rather than rely on the discovery procedures available in international
arbitration; and (4) providing foreign investors with a remedy for denial of
justice, together with a robust means to prove such a violation, alters the
host state's incentives and requires it to play a two-level game that
reconciles international obligations with domestic political preferences.
I.

INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DENIAL OF JUSTICE

Procedural due process is a fundamental human right. Article 10 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[e]veryone is
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of
any criminal charges against him." 3 Similarly, Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights provides that "[i]n the determination of his
civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law." 4
International law has been particularly concerned with the treatment of
foreigners in domestic judicial proceedings. Guarantees of procedural due
process for aliens in a foreign land have a longstanding pedigree.5 One

3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 10, U.N. Doc
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
4. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); see also International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.").
5. For a discussion of the historical antecedents of the doctrine, see, e.g., EDWIN M. BORCHARD,
THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENs ABROAD 100 (1915); ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1938); JAN PAULSSON,
DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-38 (2005); STEPHEN M. SCHM'EBEL,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 66 (1987); CHARLES DE VISSCHER, LE
DENI DE JUSTICE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 52 HAGUE RECUEIL 370 (1935); G.G. Fitzmaurice,
The Meaning of the Term 'Denial of Justice", 13 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 108 (1932); Hans Spiegel, Ongin and
Development of Denialofjustice, 32 AMER. J. INT'L L. 63 (1938).
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historian writing in 1938 dated the origins of denial of justice back to the
thirteenth century as the legal justification for acts of reprisal. 6
[R]eprisals ... came to be a measure which in comparatively early
days aimed at enforcing the right of foreigners to protective justice,
and [were] not permissible unless there was a denial of justice ....
[A]t the present time denial of justice does not lead to self-help on
the part of the injured party, and, as a rule, not even to reprisals. It
leads merely to a peaceful reclamation by the state and, in certain
cases, the dispute is settled amicably by an arbitral award.7
As for its content, one well-known historical formulation summarized
the international minimum standard for due process:
[T]he foreigner shall enjoy full freedom to appear before the courts
for the protection or defence of his rights, whether as plaintiff or
defendant; to bring any action provided or authorised by law; to
deliver any pleading by way of defence, set off or counterclaim; to
engage Counsel; to adduce evidence, whether documentary or oral
or of any other kind; to apply for bail; to lodge appeals and, in
short, to use the Courts fully and to avail himself of any procedural
remedies or guarantees provided by the law of the land in order
that justice may be administered on a footing of equality with
nationals of the country.8
Under international law, the term of art given for violations of
fundamental due process is the "denial of justice." Today the modern
concept of denial of justice is broad, encompassing both outside
interference in judicial proceedings and misconduct on the part of the
judiciary itself.9 The former category encompasses issues such as (1) access
to courts;' 0 (2) legislation targeting foreigners;' (3) repudiation of an
agreement to arbitrate;12 (4) governmental interference in the courts;13 (5)
6. See Spiegel, supra note 5, at 66.
7. Id at 81.
8. Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. U.K.), 23 I.L.R. 306, 325 (Arb. Comm'n. 1956).
9. See PAULSSON, supra note 5, at 131-206.
10. Ambatielos, 23 I.L.R. at 325; Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524, 531-36
(1975).
11. Societe des Grands Travaux de Marseille v. East Pakistan Dev. Corp., ICC Case No. 1803
(1972), excerpted in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-1985, at 44 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves
Derains eds., 1990) ("[The notion that a debt should become void and indeed nonexistent ab initio
for no better reason than that the debtor has chosen to put it in dispute is an extreme example of
what natural justice abhors .... It is a flagrant abuse of right.").
12. Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87 301-B. Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), para. 50 (1994); Himpurna Calif. Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia, Final Award
(Oct. 16, 1999) XXV Y.B. CoMN. ARB. 109, 182-83 (2000).
13. Robert E. Brown (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), (Nov. 23, 1923), VI RIAA 120, 129; Jacob Idler v.
Venezuela (1885), mprinted in J.B. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE U.S. HAS BEEN A PARTY, 3425, 3516-17 (1898).
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manipulation in the composition of the courts;14 (6) excessive public
pressure; 5 and (7) failure to execute judgments.1 6 The latter includes issues
such as (1) a refusal to judge;' 7 (2) undue delay;18 (3) illegitimate assertion
of jurisdiction;' 9 (4) due process violations; 20 (5) discrimination or
prejudice;21 (6) corruption;22 (7) arbitrariness; 23 (8) retroactive application
of laws; 24 and (9) bad faith and gross incompetence. 25
In addition to the customary international law standard for denial of
justice, many BITs have adopted a lex specialis that guarantees greater
investor protections for procedural due process. 26 For example, the United
States-Ecuador BIT provides in Article 11(7) that "[e]ach Party shall
provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with
respect to investment, investment agreements, and investment
authorizations." 27 That provision, which also appears in the Energy
Charter 28 and several other U.S. BITs, is a "distinct and potentially lessdemanding test ... as compared to denial of justice under customary
international law." 29 While denial of justice under customary international
law requires "egregious conduct that 'shocks, or at least surprises, a sense
of judicial propriety," this lesser standard requires a mere "failure of
domestic courts to enforce rights 'effectively."' 30
Until recent decades, the denial of justice was frequently a wrong
without a remedy.3' Foreign investors aggrieved at their treatment in
14. MOORE, supra note 13, at 3516-17.
15. Abraham Solomon (U.S. v. Pan.), (June 29, 1933), VI RIAA 370, 372-73.
16. Antoine Fabiani (No. 2) (Fr. v. Venez.), (July 31, 1905), X RIAA 4878, 4883-900.
17. Id. at 4884-902; Azinian v. Mexico, (Nov. 1, 1999), 5 ICSID Reports 269, para.102; Mondev
v. United States, (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 ILM 85 (2003), paras.126-127.
18. Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, Partial Award (Mar. 30, 2010),
paras. 250, 272, available at http://tinyurl.com/b54cc25; Robert Azinian v. United Mexican States,
(Nov. 1, 1999), 5 ICSID Rep. 272, para. 102 (2002).
19. MOORE, supra note 13, at 3514-15.
20. Loewen v. United States, 7 ICSID Rep. 442 paras. 132-37 (2005).
21. Id para.135.
22. Coles 78 British & Foreign State Papers 1305, 1328 (1886).
23. Amco v. Indonesia, (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 389, paras. 198-202 (1993).
24. Mondev v. United States, (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003), paras. 137-38.
25. Jacob Idler v. Venezuela, Moore, Arbitrations, 3491, 3510; The Orient (U.S. v. Mex., Moore,
Arbitrations, 3229-31; Azinian v. Mexico, (Nov. 1 1999), 5 ICSID Rep. 272, para. 103 (2002).
26. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 411 (2009).

27. United States-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-EC, Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 103-15, art. 11(7).
28. Energy Charter, art. 10(12) Dec. 17, 1991.
29. Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, Partial Award (Mar. 30, 2010), para.
244, available at http://tinyurl.com/b54cc25.
30. Id.
31. See Alexis Mourre & Alexandre Vagenheim, Some comments on Denial of Justice in Pablic
International Law After Loewen and Sat'em, in BERNADO CREMADES, LIBER AMICORUM: SOME
COMMENTS ON DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 848 (M.A.

Fernindez-Ballesteros & David Arias, eds., 2010).
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domestic proceedings had few choices to redress their plight. By the early
20th century, reprisals and self-help were off the table, and the only other
viable option - the diplomatic espousal of claims pursuant to a
friendship, commerce, and navigation treaty (FCN) or similar treaties were cumbersome and rare events.
The seminal development that altered this course of events was the rise
of bilateral investment treaties. These BITs incorporated guarantees of
minimum due process and afforded investors the right to arbitrate denial
of justice claims directly against the host state before impartial and
independent international tribunals. At the end of the Cold War there were
fewer than 400 bilateral investment treaties. 32 Today almost 180 countries
have entered into over 2,600 BITs. 33 Pursuant to these treaties, nations are
now under an international legal obligation to guarantee foreign investors a
minimum standard of due process in domestic court judicial proceedings,
and sovereigns authorize international tribunals to examine and remedy
instances that fall below that standard.
The posture of these international tribunals is in marked contrast to the
deference and coordination that occurs between domestic courts, where
there are well-developed principles for addressing the allocation of judicial
authority between sovereign states. 34 The sovereign equality of states is a
central feature of that allocation. Among the guidelines for allocating
judicial authority is the longstanding principle that
[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.3 5
Now, with the formation of international tribunals, sovereign states
have established an effective means to redress grievances arising from
government misconduct: empowering these international tribunals to sit in
judgment on the acts of government, including acts of the judiciary. Given

32. Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT- The Growth of BilateralInvestment Treaties and Their Impact on
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655, 655 (1990) (referencing that there were
309 BITS in 1989); UNCTAD Analysis of BITs, available at http://tinyurl.com/bfpkdxv (referencing
that there were 385 BITs in 1989).
33. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 172 (3d ed. 2010).

34. These principles include decisions on whether to dismiss legal actions on the basis of forum
non conveniens, lis alibi pendens, choice of forum clauses, international comity, and the act of state
doctrine. Closely related are decisions regarding whether to recognize and enforce foreign judgments.
See Christopher Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 67, 77-80 (2009).
35. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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the efficacy of this nascent system, it is not surprising that denial of justice
claims are on the rise. 36
II.

ANCILLARY DISCOVERY UNDER SECTION 1782

The decision to launch an investment arbitration against a host state
triggers a series of procedural weapons to discover the breadth and depth
of an alleged international law violation. One of the most important of
these is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which empowers federal courts to
order any person within its jurisdiction to be deposed or produce
documents upon the request of any interested person. Section 1782
provides in relevant part:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is
found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a
foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations
conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made
pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign
or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested
person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or
the document or other thing be produced, before a person
appointed by the court. 37
This procedural device has only recently been applied in the
international arbitration context, but its impact has been impressive. In
one landmark case involving allegations of judicial impropriety, a series of
Section 1782 orders were critical to bolster allegations of a widespread
conspiracy to commit fraud in securing an $18 billion Ecuadorian court
judgment against a U.S. corporation.
A.

Anillary DiscoveU in Aid ofInternationalArbitration

Before 2004 it was widely assumed that Section 1782 discovery orders
were unavailable in aid of international arbitration.3 8 The two federal
circuits that addressed the issue both found that an international arbitral
panel established by private parties was not an "international tribunal"
within the meaning of the statute. In NBC v. Bear Stearns, the Second
Circuit held that Section 1782 was "intended to cover governmental or
36. Mourre & Vagenheim, supra note 31, at 858.
37. 28 U.S.C. 5 1782(a).
38. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, InternadonalTribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43
VA. J. INT'L L. 675, 679 n.13 (2003) (noting that U.S. courts have rejected a broad definition of
international tribunal for "there is nothing in the text or legislative history to support such a broad
definition and it would require federal courts to provide greater assistance to foreign and
international private arbitral tribunals than to wholly domestic arbitral tribunals").
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intergovernmental arbitral tribunals and conventional courts and other
state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies" and that "Congress did not intend
for that statute to apply to an arbitral body established by private
parties." 39 Likewise, in Republic of Ka.akhstan v. Biedermann International,the
Fifth Circuit concluded that "the term 'foreign and international tribunals'
in § 1782 was not intended to authorize resort to United States federal
courts to assist discovery in private international arbitrations. The
provision was enlarged to further comity among nations, not to complicate
and undermine the salutary device of private international arbitration." 40
That changed in 2004 when the Supreme Court, in Intel Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., addressed the scope of Section 1782 for the first time. 41
The critical question in Intel was whether antitrust proceedings before the
European Commission - the executive and administrative organ of the
constituted a "proceeding in a foreign or
European Communities international tribunal" within the meaning of the statute. Given that the
European Commission combined both prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions, the Supreme Court concluded that it had "no warrant to
exclude the European Commission, to the extent that it acts as a firstinstance decision-maker, from 5 1782(a)'s ambit." 42 It further held that a
pending, rather than actual proceeding was sufficient to trigger Section
1782, as long as "a dispositive ruling by the Commission, reviewable by the
European courts, [was] within reasonable contemplation." 43
Although the Supreme Court did not address international arbitration
directly, its reasoning appeared to support a broad interpretation that
would encompass arbitral tribunals, which likewise act as "first-instance
decision-makers" that render "dispositive rulings" subject to limited
national court review. Moreover, in describing the scope of Section 1782,
the Court found that Congress amended the statute in 1964 to "provide
the possibility of U.S. judicial assistance in connection with administrative
and quasi-judicial proceedings abroad" and quoted scholarly commentary
that defined the term "tribunal" to include "investigating magistrates,
administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as
conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative courts." 44
The Court concluded with cautionary considerations that a federal court
should exercise when ordering Section 1782 discovery; with particular
focus on the subject, motive, nature, and context of the discovery request.
Specifically, the Court encouraged lower courts to consider: (1) whether
39. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190-91 (2d Cir. 1999).
40. Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999).
41. 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
42. Id. at 258.
43. Id. at 259.
44. Id. at 258 (citing Smit, InternationalLitigation under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1015, 1026 n.71 (1965)).
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the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign
or international proceeding; (2) whether the nature and character of the
foreign tribunal would make judicial assistance appropriate; (3) whether
the foreign or international court is receptive to federal court judicial
assistance; (4) whether the discovery request conceals an attempt to
circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other legitimate policies;
and (5) whether the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome. 45
In the wake of Intel, federal courts have struggled to apply the Court's
liberal Section 1782 standards to the context of international arbitration.
Lower courts are divided on the question of whether a contract-based
private international arbitral panel satisfies the statutory definition of
"international tribunal." 46
A majority of courts have concluded that arbitral tribunals established
by private contract are "foreign or international tribunals." 47 The Eleventh
Circuit, for example, took Intel's functional approach and concluded that a
contractually-based "arbitral panel is . . . 'a first-instance decision-maker'

whose judgment is subject to judicial review, and we therefore 'have no
warrant to exclude [it] . . . from 5 1782(a)'s ambit."' 48 Under this analysis,
the functional approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Intel suggests
that contract-based arbitral tribunals are first-instance decision-makers that
49
issue decisions both responsive to the complaint and reviewable in court.
"[It is the function of the body that makes it a 'tribunal,' not its formal
identity as a 'governmental' or 'private' institution." 50
Other federal district courts have concluded that private arbitral
tribunals are not "international tribunals" within the meaning of Section
1782.51 These courts focus on arbitration as an alternative to litigation,
45. Id. at 264-65.
46. For a discussion of this case law, see Kenneth Beale et al., Solving the f 1782 Puzzle: Bringing
Certainty to the Debate over 28 U.S.C f 1782s Application to InternationalArbitration,47 STAN. J. INT'L L.
51, 67-89 (2011); Jenna M. Godfrey, Comment, Americanization ofDiscove.r Why StatutoU Intertation
Bars 28 U.S.C f 1782(a)'s Application in Private InternationalArbitration Proceedings, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
475, 492-98 (2010).
47. See In ir Broadsheet L.L.C., 2011 WL 4949864, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 18, 2011); Government of
Ghana v. ProEnergy Services, L.L.C., 2011 WL 2652755, at *3 (W.D. Mo. June 6, 2011); Ex rel
Application of Winning (HK) Shipping Co. Ltd., 2010 WL 1796579, at *3-10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30,
2010); OJSC Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., 2009 WL 2877156, at *2-5 (D. Conn. Aug. 27,
2009); In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F.Supp. 2d 233, 237-40 (D. Mass. 2008); In re Hallmark Capital
Corp., 534 F.Supp. 2d 951, 953-57 (D. Minn. 2007); In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F.Supp. 2d 1221,
1223-28 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
48. In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc., 685
F.3d 987, 997 (11th Cir. 2012) (second and third alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also
Bobcock Borsig AG, 583 F.Supp. 2d, at 240 ("There is no textual basis upon which to draw a
distinction between public and private arbitral tribunals, and the Supreme Court in Intel repeatedly
refused to place 'categorical limitations' on the availability of § 1782(a).") (citation omitted).
49. In re Roz Trading, 469 F.Supp. 2d at 1225.
50. Id. at 1228.
51. In or Finserve Group Ltd., 2011 WL 5024264 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2011); In re Application by
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foreclosing a key element of Intel's analysis: judicial review. 52 "[T]he very
narrow circumstances in which [arbitral] decisions may be subject to
review does not allow for judicial review of the merits of the parties'
dispute. Accordingly, the 'arbitral tribunal' at issue here does not fall within
the definition the Supreme Court embraced in its Intel dictum."53
Moreover, the fact that the source of judicial authority is derived from
private agreement likewise "militate[s] against classifying it as a foreign or
international proceeding under § 1782."54 Finally, pragmatic concerns have
loomed large in the analysis. "Interpreting § 1782 to apply to voluntary,
private international arbitrations would be a body blow to such arbitration,
since it would create a tremendous disincentive to engage in such
arbitration wherever, as here, such a reading would create substantially
asymmetrical discovery obligations." 55
Whatever doubts there may be about the application of Section 1782 to
contract-based international arbitration, federal courts uniformly agree that
an arbitral tribunal established pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty
constitutes an "international tribunal" within the meaning of the statute.
The focus of most Section 1782 litigation in the BIT context has not been
on whether the statutory criteria have been satisfied, but whether the
discretionary considerations outlined in Intel militate in favor or against
granting discovery.
Since Intel, over twenty federal courts have considered motions to
compel Section 1782 discovery in aid of proceedings before treaty-based
investment arbitration tribunals. 56 Not a single federal court has held that
Rhodianyl S.A.S. 11-1026-JTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 2011); In re An
Arbitration in London, England, between Norfolk S. Corp., Norfolk S. Ry. Co., & Gen. Sec. Ins. Co.,
and Ace Bermuda Ltd., 626 F.Supp. 2d 882, 883-86 (N.D. Ill. 2009); In re Application of Operadora
DB Mexico, S.A., 2009 WL 2423138, at *8-12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009); La Comision Ejecutiva
Hidroelecctrica Del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617 F.Supp.2d 481, 485-487 (S.D. Tex. 2008), affd
341 Fed. Appx. 31, 2009 WL 2407189 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2009) (unpublished).
52. Norfolk S. Cop., 626 F.Supp. 2d at 886; El Paso, 617 F.Supp. 2d at 485; OperadoraDB Mexico,
2009 WL 2423138 at *10.
53. Norfolk S. Corp., 626 F.Supp. 2d at 886.
54. OperadoraDB Mexico, 2009 WL 2423138 at *11.
55. Rbodianyl, Case No. 11-1026-JTM at 31. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished
opinion, expressed concern that "empowering parties in international arbitrations to seek ancillary
discovery through federal courts could destroy arbitration's principal advantage as a 'speedy,
economical, and effective means of dispute resolution' if the parties 'succumb to fighting over
burdensome discovery requests far from the place of arbitration."' El Paso Corp. v. La Comision
Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa, 341 Fed. Appx. 31, 34 (5th Cir. 2009).
56. In re Application of Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2011); In re Application of Chevron
Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 161, (3d Cir. 2011); In ne Application of Ecuador, 2011 WL 4434816, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011); In re Application of Ecuador, 2011 WL 4089189, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13,
2011); Republic of Ecuador v. Bjorkman, 801 F.Supp. 2d 1121, 1124 (D. Colo. 2011), affd 2011 WL
5439681 (D. Colo. Nov. 9, 2011); In re Republic of Ecuador, 2011 WL 736868, at *1-3, (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 22, 2011); In re Application of Chevron Corp., 762 F.Supp. 2d 242, 250-52 (D. Mass. 2010);
Chevron Corp. v. Shefftz, 754 F.Supp. 2d 254, 260 (D. Mass. 2010); In ar Republic of Ecuador, 2010
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such arbitral tribunals fall short of the statutory definition of an
"international tribunal."57
The vast majority of these cases arose in the context of Chevron's
investment arbitration claim filed in September 23, 2009, against the
Republic of Ecuador alleging that judicial proceedings in Ecuador violate
the Ecuador-United States Bilateral Investment Treaty. 58 As noted above,
that treaty guarantees fundamental due process, including the "effective
means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment,
investment agreements, and investment authorizations."5 9 It also
authorizes investors to file an arbitration claim in accordance with the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 60 Thus, the arbitration proceeding is
established by treaty, with Ecuador consenting in advance to be subject to
investment arbitration and the United States securing for its nationals,
including Chevron, third-party beneficiary rights to pursue international
law claims against Ecuador.
Rather than take a functional approach that analyzes whether the
investment tribunal is a first-instance decision-maker rendering decisions
subject to judicial review, these courts either assume that such arbitral
panels are "international tribunals," or focus on the fact that the arbitral
tribunal has its origins in a bilateral investment treaty. Although the
WL 4973492, at *6-8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010); Berlinger, 709 F.Supp. 2d 283, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
affd Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d. Cir. 2011); In re Application of Caratube Int'l Oil
Co., 730 F.Supp. 2d 101, 104-05 (D.D.C. 2010) (assuming without deciding that ICSID arbitration
panels are "international tribunals"); In it Application of Chevron Corp. (Donge), 749 F.Supp. 2d
141, 159-160 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Application of Ricardo Veiga, 746 F.Supp. 2d 8, 22-23 (D.D.C.
2010); In rt Chevron Corp., 753 F.Supp. 2d 536, 539 (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2010); In re Chevron Corp.,
2010 WL 4883111, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2010) (determining that there was no need to decide
whether an arbitral proceeding was an "international tribunal" in light of foreign proceeding in
Ecuador); In re Republic of Ecuador, 2010 WL 4027740, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010); In it
Republic of Ecuador, 2010 WL 3702427, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Camp,
2010 WL 3418394, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., 2010
WL 2135217 (D. Colo. May 25, 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., 2010 WL 1488010
(D. Colo. Apr. 13, 2010); Order, In it Chevron, No. 1:10-MI-0076-TWT-GGB (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2,
2010); In it Application of Oxus Gold PLC, 2006 WL 2927615 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006).
57. In one unpublished order, a federal district court concluded that existing Fifth Circuit
precedent controlled the question of whether arbitral tribunals are international tribunals within the
meaning of Section 1782, and concluded that an investment arbitration tribunal was not an
international tribunal. This order is on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. See Republic of Ecuador v.
Connor, Case No. H-11-516 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012).
58. Ecuador-United States Bilateral Investment Treaty, (Aug. 27, 1993), S. Treaty Doc. No. 10315, available at http://tinyur.com/a41bv5y. Among the allegations are that the Republic of Ecuador
(1) improperly exercised defacto jurisdiction over Chevron; (2) improperly assisted and colluded with
the Lago Agrio plaintiffs in an effort to impose the state's obligations on Chevron; (3) improperly
influenced the Ecuador courts through public statements; and (4) abused the Ecuador criminal justice
system to advance Ecuador's improper goals. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, Claimant's
Notice of Arbitration, (Sept. 23, 2009), at 15-16, availableat http://tinyur.com/aacj2dh.
59. Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 58, art. II, para. 7.
60. Id. at art. VI.

138

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 53:127

absence of judicial review in the investment context is even more
pronounced than in private commercial arbitration, this factor has not
been featured in any of the decisions applying Section 1782 to investment
arbitration. In short, federal courts take a functional approach in defining
an "international tribunal" in the commercial arbitration context, and a
formalist approach in the investment arbitration context.
In the investment arbitration context, the locus of discussion has been
on the Intel discretionary factors. The question is not whether Section 1782
authorizes federal courts to aid investment arbitration, but rather, whether
they should in light of Intel. The exercise of discretion is particularly
important in the denial of justice context, because any decision to grant
Section 1782 discovery will impact domestic court proceedings and
international arbitration proceedings. Intel requires federal courts to
scrutinize, among other things, the nature and character of the foreign or
international proceedings, the foreign or international court's receptivity to
the discovery, and whether the discovery will circumvent restrictions
imposed by the foreign or international court. 61 One cannot balance those
factors without considering whether Section 1782 discovery will be used in
aid of the domestic court proceedings, the international arbitral
proceedings, or both.
For example, in UBR, the Third Circuit addressed the propriety of a
Section 1782 discovery request designed to attack the credibility of the
Ecuadorian court system, with Chevron alleging that Ecuadorian plaintiffs
and their experts conspired with the Ecuadorian court to produce a
fraudulent assessment of environmental damage. 62 Appellants UBR argued
that Chevron did not seek discovery for "use in a proceeding before a
foreign tribunal," but rather "to attack the tribunal itself." 63 The Third
Circuit rejected the argument, finding that the evidence Chevron seeks
would be used in the BIT arbitration to attack the Ecuadorian court, and
this "unquestionably would be 'for a use in a foreign or international
tribunal.' The fact that the evidence may be utilized to cast doubts on the
impartiality of the Lago Agrio Court does not mean that Chevron's request
for the evidence runs afoul of Section 1782 and that therefore Chevron
64
may not obtain the evidence."
As for the Intel discretionary factors, the question in UBR was not
whether the Ecuadorian court would be receptive to discovery establishing
that its judgment was procured by fraud, but rather whether the BIT
arbitral panel would be receptive to such evidence. Any suggestion that

61.
62.
63.
64.

Intel Corp. v. Advanced Microdevices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264-65 (2004).
In re Chevron, 633 F.3d at 159-60.
Id. at 161.
Id.
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"the BIT arbitral panel would not be receptive to the evidence," the Third
Circuit concluded, was based on "pure speculation." 65
Likewise, in Berlinger, the Southern District of New York rejected
arguments that Section 1782 discovery would undermine the Ecuadorian
court and therefore frustrate the comity interests underlying the statute.66
The fact that the Ecuadorian courts might not be receptive to evidence of
fraud to be used in international arbitration was of little consequence.
Given that the "petitioners seek relief ... out of concern that political
influence may have been brought to bear in Ecuador in an inappropriate
way," opposition by the Ecuadorian courts "to these applications would
not be dispositive." 67
In other words, the filing of an international arbitration challenging the
administration of justice in a foreign court dramatically alters the exercise
of Intel discretion. While the foreign court may not be receptive to
discovery of judicial misconduct, such evidence will further arbitration
proceedings adjudicating such questions. As the Southern District of New
York reasoned in Don ger, "even if the Ecuadorian courts opposed these
subpoenas ... such opposition would not be dispositive .... [S]ight must
not be lost of the role of the discovery sought here in respect of the BIT
arbitration. Certainly this discovery would be helpful to that tribunal." 68

B.

DiscoveU Standards Under Section 1782

One of the most powerful weapons that a party can wield against its
litigation adversary is American-style discovery. As one civil law
practitioner put it, "[i]t is difficult to overstate the horror with which
parties and counsel outside the United States view the prospect of
American-style discovery, with parties able to serve upon one another
sweeping requests for production of documents and other information
relevant to the litigation, and to obtain oral deposition testimony of
witnesses in advance of trial."69 Yet this is precisely what Section 1782
does in aid of international arbitration.
Once a federal court has determined that discovery is authorized and
appropriate under Section 1782, the federal standards for discoverability
are triggered. Section 1782 gives federal courts broad leeway in fashioning
the scope of discovery, authorizing courts to "prescribe the practice and

65. Id. at 163.
66. Berlinger, 709 F.Supp. 2d 283, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) affd Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d
297 (2d. Cit. 2011).
67. Id.
68. Dongger,749 F.Supp. 2d 141, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Chevron, 2010 WL 4883111, at *3
(W.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2010).
69. Javier Rubenstein, International CommerialArbitration: Reflections at the Crssroads of the Common
Law and CitilLaw Traditions, 5 CHI.J. INT'L L. 303, 304 (2004).
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procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of
the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony
or statement or producing the document or other thing." 70 But in the
absence of such an order, the default rule is that "the testimony or
statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 71 As the legislative
history emphasized:
[S]ection 1782 gives the court complete discretion in prescribing
the procedure to be followed. It permits, but does not command,
following the foreign or international practice. If the court fails to
prescribe the procedure, the appropriate provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be followed, irrespective of whether
the foreign or international proceeding or investigation is of a
criminal, civil, administrative, or other nature. 72
In practice, courts have applied this default rule, permitting parties to
discover "any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense."73 The ramifications for applying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to Section 1782 discovery are profound, dramatically expanding
the scope of discoverable evidence.
First, relevant information under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1) "need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 74
That same liberal standard of relevance applies to Section 1782
discovery. 75 Any doubt as to whether the evidence is relevant should be
resolved in favor of discovery. 76 This is particularly so in the Section 1782
context, where a district court's only connection to the case is supervision
of discovery ancillary to an action elsewhere, in which case the court
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006); see Kestrel Coal Pty. Ltd. v. Joy Global Inc., 362 F.3d 401, 404
(7th Cir. 2004) (holding that discovery "must conform either to the procedure of the foreign nation
or to that of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure').
71. 28 U.S.C. §1782(a) (2006); see, e.g., Kulzer v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 2011)
("[D]iscovery sought under section 1782 must (in the absence of a contrary order by the district
court) comply with Rule 26 and the other rules governing discovery in federal courts.").
72. S. REP. No. 88-1580 at 8 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3789.
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see, e.g., Weber v. Finker, 554 F.3d 1379, 1384-85 (11th Cir. 2009); In
re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1336 (11th Cir. 2007); Chevron Corp. v. Shefftz, 754 F.Supp. 2d 254, 264
(D. Mass. 2010); In re Chevron Corp., 2010 WL 4883111, at *4 (W.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2010); In re
Application of Eli Lilli, 2010 WL 2509133, at *3 (D. Conn. June 15, 2010); In re Application Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 249 F.R.D. 96, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
75. Ghana v. ProEnergy Services, LLC, 2011 WL 2652755, at *6 (W.D. Mo. June 6, 2011)
("Discovery is as broad under § 1782 as it is under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Thus, if there is a possibility
that the discovery may lead to information relevant to the subject matter of the action, then the
discovery should generally be allowed.").
76. In re Application of Ricardo Veiga, 746 F.Supp. 2d 8, 19 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Application
Pursuant to Section 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 249 F.R.D. 96, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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"should be especially hesitant to pass judgment on what constitutes
relevant evidence."77
Second, Section 1782 authorizes a federal district court to order
depositions or documentary evidence against any individual who "resides
or is found" in the district, including third parties who are not named
parties in the foreign proceeding. In one case, the Second Circuit affirmed
a district court issuance of a Section 1782 order in aid of French litigation
against a third party who lived and worked in France, but was "found" in
New York - visiting an art gallery.78 In another case, discovery was
deemed appropriate based on the expectation that the individual would be
found in the district in the near future.79
Third, Section 1782 authorizes a federal district court to order discovery
in aid of international proceedings against any third party, regardless of
how attenuated the relationship of that party to the litigants. In one case,
Google was ordered to produce documents relating to email accounts it
hosted that were opened and held by foreign nationals involved in foreign
proceedings.8
Fourth, Section 1782 authorizes a federal district court to order
discovery in aid of international proceedings "upon the application of any
interested party." 81 There is no requirement that the party requesting
federal court discovery be a litigant in the foreign or international
proceedings. As the Supreme Court emphasized, any person who
"possesses a reasonable interest in obtaining judicial assistance ... qualifies
as an interested person" under Section 1782.82
This standard of discovery is remarkably different from the approach of
evidence gathering in international arbitration. Discovery in the
international arbitration context is a hybrid of civil and common law
traditions. The civil law tradition, of course, employs the inquisitorial
model, with discovery controlled by the courts and the parties having no
power to demand relevant materials from one another, much less third
parties. The evidence that is gathered by civil law courts is often that which
the parties voluntarily proffer. Interrogatories, depositions, and adverse
document production are alien concepts. 83
77. In re Honeywell Int'l. Inc., 230 F.R.D. 293, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
78. In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[W]e hold that if a person is served
with a subpoena while physically present in the district of the court that issued the discovery order,
then for purposes of § 1782(a), he is 'found' in that district.").
79. In meOxus Gold PLC, No. 06-82, 2006 WL 2927615, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006).
80. See, e.g., In re Beluga Shipping GmbH & Co., 2010 WL 3749279, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2010).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (emphasis added).
82. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Microdevices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256 (2004).
83. See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard, Discove? and the Role ofthe judge in CiilLaw Jurisdicions, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1017 (1998) (discussing the differences between U.S. and foreign nations' discovery
standards and procedures); James Beardsley, The ProofofFactin French Civil Pcedue, 34 AM. J. COMP.
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Modern international arbitration practice combines elements of both
common law and civil law traditions. As far as oral evidence, the civil law
tradition dominates; depositions are rare, and witness statements are the
norm. 84 Interrogatories are similarly uncommon. On the other hand,
document production in international arbitration roughly parallels the
common law approach, but the standard for what is discoverable is much
narrower. While there is no automatic right to demand documents of the
opposing side, a party may request the arbitral tribunal to order another
party to produce "a narrow and specific requested category of
documents."8 5 Typically the tribunal will grant such request if it determines
that the documents "are relevant to the case and material to its
outcome." 86 A party subject to such a production request may object to
production if, among other things, the request is not sufficiently relevant,
unreasonably burdensome, there are applicable privileges, or compelling
reasons of fairness and equality against disclosure.87 The tradition in
international arbitration is to "refuse expansive, fishing-expedition
discovery requests."8 8 Moreover, as a general rule international arbitral
tribunals have no authority to request documents or oral testimony for
third parties, and therefore a party's ability to procure evidence from third
parties will be limited accordingly.
Given these limitations, it is not surprising that ancillary discovery
under Section 1782 is an attractive tool for American lawyers gathering
evidence to prove denial of justice. Nor is it surprising that lawyers from
other traditions view this trend with skepticism.

III. THE CASE STUDY OF CHEVRON V. ECUADOR
The most important example of ancillary discovery to prove denial of
justice is Chevron v. Ecuador. The dispute presents a case study of just how
significant Section 1782 proceedings may be for international tribunals
addressing allegations of foreign judicial misconduct.
The seminal event that precipitated Chevron's allegations of denial of
justice in Ecuador was the January 2009 screening of the film Crude at the
Sundance Film Festival in Park City, Utah. The film documented the case

L. 459 (1986) (discussing French discovery procedures for civil trials); Volker Triebel, An Outline of the
Siwns/German Rules of Ciil Procedureand Practice Relating to Evidence, 47 ARB. 221 (1982).
84. INT'L. BAR ASs'N. RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, art. 4 (2010); GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1903-05
(2009).
85. Id.
86. INT'L. BAR. Ass'N. RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, art. 3 (2010).
87. Id at art. 9.2.
88. BORN, sgpranote 84, at 1907.
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of indigenous Ecuadorian plaintiffs in a David vs. Goliath battle against
Chevron over alleged environmental damage in Ecuador. Scenes in the
film depicted an exparte meeting between plaintiffs' lawyers and a medical
expert working with the Ecuadorian court-appointed Special Master,
plaintiff lawyer Steven Donziger storming into an Ecuadorian judge's
chambers, and Donziger declaring that you had to play dirty with litigation
in Ecuador. 9 If such conduct made the final cut of the film, Chevron
lawyers queried what evidence remained on the cutting room floor.
On the basis of these and similar scenes, Chevron filed a Section 1782
motion in the Southern District of New York against Cmde director Joe
Berlinger; requesting over six hundred hours of film outtakes. The district
court granted the motion, finding that "[r]eview of Berlinger's outtakes will
contribute to the goal of seeing not only that justice is done, but that it
appears to be done."9 0
Chevron then filed over twenty-three motions for Section 1782
discovery against various third-party witnesses with knowledge of
pertinent facts pertaining to the Ecuadorian litigation. These proceedings
"have resulted in at least fifty orders and opinions from federal courts
across the country." 9' The sheer extent of such Section 1782 discovery
was, as the Third Circuit put it, "unique in the annals of American judicial
history." 92 In every single case federal district courts granted in whole or in
part Chevron's motions for ancillary discovery.
The results of the ancillary discovery orders allowed Chevron to present
what it described as "shocking revelations" of fraud and corruption.9 3
Among the direct quotes attributable to the Ecuador plaintiff lawyers
were: (1) "All the judges [in Ecuador] are corrupt;" (2) "the only
language ... this judge is gonna understand is one of pressure,
intimidation, and humiliation;" (3) "[In] Ecuador ... this is how the game
is played, it's dirty;" (4) "[The court-appointed Special Master will have] to
totally play ball with us and let us take the lead while projecting the image
that he is working for the court;" (5) "[A]ll this bull***t about the law and
facts . . . in the end of the day it is about brute force;" (6) "[We] could jack
this thing up to thirty billion ... in one day;" (7) "[Evidence of
groundwater contamination] was smoke and mirrors and bull***t, it really
is;" and (8) "[Ilf you repeat a lie a thousand times it becomes the truth." 94

89. Berlinger, 709 F.Supp. 2d 283, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) affd Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629
F.3d 297 (2d. Cir. 2011); Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal ofFortune, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 2012).
90. Berlinger,709 F.Supp. 2d at 299.
91. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012).
92. In tr Chevron, 650 F.3d 276, 282 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
93. Keefe, supra note 89.
94. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 20-23, Chevron v. Camacho, 667 F.3d. 232 (2d. Cir. 2012) (No.
11-1150).
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The outtakes and other evidence gathered pursuant to Section 1782
were, according to the Southern District of New York, "remarkably
informative" about the entire Lago Agrio litigation, providing "ample
evidence of fraud in the Ecuadorian proceedings." 95 According to that
court, the evidence gathered pursuant to ancillary discovery established,
among other things: (1) that the appointment and independence of the
Ecuadorian-court Special Master was irregular; (2) that the plaintiffs
"ghost-wrote" the Special Master's expert report; and (3) that the plaintiffs
"orchestrated a campaign to intimidate the Ecuadorian judiciary." 96
Another federal court found that the $18 billion Lago Agrio judgment was
a "virtual line-by-line entry" of an internal plaintiff document
surreptitiously provided to the court but not placed in the record.97 Other
federal courts made similar findings of fraud.98
When deposed, Steven Donzinger admitted under oath that plaintiffs'
expert consultant, Stratus Consulting, wrote parts of the Special Master's
expert report which the expert adopted verbatim.99 Internal

95. Chevron v. Donziger, 768 F.Supp. 2d 581, 605, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) rev'd on othergrounds, 667
F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012).
96. Id. at 612. On the basis of this evidence, the district court enjoined the Ecuadorian plaintiffs
from enforcing the judgment abroad. Id. at 633-34. On January 26, 2012, the Second Circuit reversed
the district court's antisuit injunction, concluding that there was no statutory authority under New
York Recognition Act to issue such a declaratory injunction. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d
232, 234 (2d Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit expressed "no views on the merits of the parties' various
charges and counter-charges regarding the Ecuadorian legal system and their adversaries' conduct of
this litigation, which may be addressed as relevant in other litigation before the district court or
elsewhere." Id at 248 n.17.
97. Chevron v. Page, RWT-11-1942 Dkt. 33,73 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2011).
98. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Weinberg Group, No. 1:11-mc-00409-JMF, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C.
Sept. 8, 2011) ("iTnhere is more than sufficient evidence of a prima facie case that [plaintiffs'
consultant] the Weinberg Group's work was part of a fraud upon the Ecuadorian court."); In m
Application of Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[There is more than a
little evidence that Donziger's activities - as several courts already have held in the context of
Section 1782 applications against experts involved on the Lago Agrio plaintiffs' side - come within
the crime-fraud exception to both the privilege and to work product protection."); In re Application
of Chevron Corp., No. 10-cv-1146-IEG(WMc), 2010 WL 3584520, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010)
("There is ample evidence in the record that the Ecuadorian Plaintiffs secretly provided information
to Mr. Cabrera, who was supposedly a neutral court-appointed expert, and colluded with Mr. Cabrera
to make it look like the opinions were his own."); In re Chevron Corp., No. 1:10-mc-00021-JCHLFG, slip op. at 3-4 (D.N.M. Sept. 2, 2010) ("The release of many hours of the outtakes has sent
shockwaves through the nation's legal communities, primarily because the footage shows, with
unflattering frankness, inappropriate, unethical and perhaps illegal conduct."); Chevron Corp. v.
Camp, Nos. 1:10-mc-27, 1 :10-mc-28, 2010 WL 3418394, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2010) ("While
this court is unfamiliar with the practices of the Ecuadorian judicial system, the court must believe
that the concept of fraud is universal, and that what has blatantly occurred in this matter would in
fact be considered fraud by any court.").
99. See Deposition of Steven Donziger at 853, Case 1:10-cv-00047-MSK-MEH, Doc. 306-1
("[Question:] "So it is a fact that Mr. Cabrera-that the Cabrera report was in part written by Stratus,
isn't it?" [Donziger:] "Stratus wrote up parts of the report, or materials, I should say, that were
adopted by him verbatim. So with that caveat, the answer to your question would be yes.").
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correspondence between Ecuadorian plaintiffs' counsel conceded that the
evidence "undermined the entire case and the credibility of the entire
plaintiffs team" 00 and warned that public disclosure of their conduct
could "destroy[ the proceedings" and result in "all of us, your
attorneys, . . . go[ing] to jail."101

Despite this evidence, Ecuador has vigorously denied allegations of
judicial misconduct and relied on ancillary discovery in the United States to
rebut Chevron's claims of fraud and corruption. Since September 2010,
Ecuador has filed at least fourteen separate Section 1782 discovery
requests against third parties who have information relevant to Chevron's
allegations.102 In particular, Ecuador sought documents and depositions
against adverse witnesses who are likely to testify against Ecuador in the
international arbitration proceeding. The approach reflects Ecuador's
decision to "take aggressive discovery of Chevron and other persons and
entities within the United States for purposes of anticipating and
countering Chevron's ongoing attempts to undermine and evade the
Ecuadorian judgment." 103
Chevron responded to Ecuador's request for ancillary discovery by
demanding "reciprocal discovery" from Ecuador, relying on Section 1782
as a tool for direct American-style discovery of its sovereign adversary in
the international proceeding.104 Thus far, those requests have been denied,
with a federal court finding that the evidence was located abroad, that the
international tribunal could issue such an order, and that Ecuador had
potential sovereign immunity defenses. 05 "The Court rejects Chevron's
attempt to shoehorn wide-ranging discovery against parties to a foreign
proceeding under the guise of 'reciprocal discovery' because it could

100. David R. Baker, Chevrn Finds a Useful Tactic in Ecuador Case, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
Jan. 2, 2011 (quoting Aug. 9, 2010 letter from plaintiff lawyer Joseph Kohn).
101. Email from Julio Prieto to Steven Donziger, (Mar. 30, 2010, 2:02:53 PM) (on file with court
case 1:11-cv-00691-LAK).
102. See, e.g., In e Application of Ecuador, Nos. C 11-80171 CRB, C 11-80172 CRB, 2011 WL
2
4434816 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011); In re Application of Ecuador, No. 2:11-mc-0005 GSA, 2011 WL
4089189 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011); Republic of Ecuador v. Bjorkman, No. 11-cv-01470-WYDMEH, 2011 WL 5439681 (D. Colo. Nov. 9, 2011); Republic of Ecuador v. Bjorkman, 801 F.Supp. 2d
1121 (D. Colo. 2011); In t Application of Ecuador, Nos. C-10-80225 MISC CRB (EMC), C-1080324 MISC CRB (EMC), 2011 WL 736868 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011); In re Application of Ecuador,
No. C-10-80225, 2010 WL 4973492 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010); In re Application of Ecuador, No. 1:10mc-00040 GSA, 2010 WL 4027740 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010); In re Application of Ecuador, No. C10-80225, 2010 WL 3702427 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010).
103. PATTON BOGGS, INVICTUS MEMO, PATH FORWARD: SECURING AND ENFORCING
JUDGMENT AND REACHING SETI1EMENT, at 8, available at http://tinyurl.com/a5n5rhs [hereinafter
INVICTIS MEMO].
104. In e Application of Ecuador, 2011 WL 736868, at *10.
105. Id.
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circumvent [the] statutory scheme under 5 1782 established by
Congress."106
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of Chevron v. Ecuador, the ability to
request ancillary discovery has proven essential to Chevron's denial of
justice claims. Section 1782 discovery was the vehicle for discovering
virtually all of the key evidence in support of its claims. This evidence
would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, to procure through the
discovery procedures in place in international arbitration. The discovery
was sought from third parties to the arbitral proceeding. Depositions of
adverse witnesses were routinely requested and granted. Claims of privilege
were frequently denied, including claims of attorney-client privilege,
attorney work product, and journalist privilege. 0 7 The scope of
documentary evidence was voluminous, far in excess of the "narrow and
specific requested category of documents" permitted under the evidentiary
standards of international arbitration.108 Pursuant to one order alone,
Steven Donziger handed over 200,000 pages of material to Chevron,
spanning almost two decades. 0 9 Chevron's deposition of Donziger lasted
eight days and produced a 2,400 page transcript.1 0 No respondent has
dared to refuse compliance with discovery orders, because to do so risked
being found in contempt of court.11'
Thus far, ancillary discovery is having its intended effect in Chevron v.
Ecuado,/s international proceedings. On February 9, 2011, the international
tribunal adjudicating Chevron's denial of justice claim concluded that
Chevron "[had] made out a sufficient case" for interim measures and
ordered Ecuador to "take all measures at its disposal to suspend or cause
to be suspended the enforcement or recognition within and without
Ecuador of any judgment against [Chevron] in the Lago Agrio case." 112 On
January 25, 2012, the tribunal confirmed and reissued the February 9, 2011
Order as an Interim Award, ordering Ecuador "to take all measures at its
disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement or
recognition within and without Ecuador of any judgment against
[Chevron] in the Lago Agrio case." 113 That Interim Award is final and
106. Id
107. See, e.g., In r Chevron, 633 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2011); Chevron v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d
Cir. 2011); In re Chevron, 749 F.Supp. 2d 141, (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Chevron v. Camp, 2010 WL 3418394
(W.D.N.C. 2010).
108. See supra note 82-86 and accompanying text.
109. Keefe, supra note 89.
110. Deposition of Steven Donziger (Nov. 29, 2010 to Dec. 29, 2010), available at
http://tinyurl.com/a879j7n.
111. See, e.g., Berlinger, 709 F.Supp. 2d 283, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) afd Chevron Corp. v.
Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cit. 2011).
112. Chevron v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Order for Interim Measures, 3 (Feb. 9, 2011),
available at http://tinyurl.com/ajzohqy.
113. Chevron v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Interim Award, 16 Oan. 25, 2012).
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binding and subject to recognition and enforcement in domestic courts in
Ecuador and elsewhere. Finally, on February 16, 2012, the tribunal issued a
Second Interim Award finding that Chevron has made a sufficient case
regarding "the Claimants' case on the merits against the Respondent" and
ordered Ecuador to prevent the Lago Agrio judgment from becoming final
and binding by precluding "any certification by the Respondent that would
cause the said judgments to be enforceable against" Chevron. 114
Despite the February 9, 2011 interim measures, on January 3, 2012, an
Ecuadorian appeals court affirmed the Lago Agrio judgment, rendering the
$18 billion judgment enforceable abroad.115 The Ecuadorian plaintiffs have
identified twenty-seven nations where Chevron has substantial activities,
and may soon seek to enforce the Lago Agrio judgment abroad. The
principal defense Chevron will raise in any such enforcement action will be
based on the evidence gathered pursuant to Section 1782. The key facts
relevant to a denial of justice claim are also relevant when defending
against a foreign judgment enforcement proceeding. Thus, ancillary
discovery in aid of international arbitration could play a fundamental role
in future enforcement proceedings in foreign courts around the world.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

There are several fundamental implications one may draw from this
review of ancillary discovery under Section 1782.

A.

The Comity of Courts

Section 1782 discovery orders in aid of international tribunals reflect
sensitivity to the comity of courts, not the comity of nations. 1 6 When
Congress amended the statute in 1964, it distinguished between ancillary
discovery in aid of foreign and international proceedings. With respect to
assistance to foreign court proceedings, federal courts should consider the
"nature and attitudes of the government from which the request emanates
and the character of the proceedings in that country."'17 With international
tribunals, by contrast, the Senate Report stated that federal courts should
consider "the nature of the tribunal and the character of the proceedings
114. Chevron v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Second Interim Award, 2-3 (Feb. 16, 2012).
115. Cause No. 2011-0106 (an. 3, 2012), availableat http://tinyurl.com/ant37du.
116. The comity of courts concerns the practice of "judges declin[ing] to exercise jurisdiction
over matters more appropriate adjudged elsewhere." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764, 817 (1993). See also Donald Childress III, Comio as Conflict: Resituating International Comi*y as
Conflicts ofLaws, 44 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 11, 61 (2010) ("Judicial comity is ... a distinct doctrine from
the 'comity of nations' because it involves a relation between courts and not between sovereigns as
such.'); Michael Ramsey, Escaping '7nternationalComity," 83 IowA L. REv. 893, 897-906 (1999)
(discussing judicial comity).
117. S. Rep. No. 88-1580 (1964), reprintedin U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788.
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before it."118 Clearly a foreign government's attitude with respect to federal
court assistance to international tribunals was not mentioned as a
discretionary factor.
The Supreme Court addressed the Senate Report in Intel in the most
cursory fashion, eliding the discretionary factors applicable to foreign
proceedings with those of international proceedings.
[A]s the 1964 Senate Report suggests, a court presented with a
§ 1782(a) request may take into account the nature of the foreign
tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the
receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad
to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance.' 19
The best reading of this cryptic admonition is to consider the receptivity
factor in the disjunctive. If the ancillary discovery is in aid of foreign court
proceedings, then the receptivity of the foreign government is relevant.120
If, by contrast, the ancillary discovery is in aid of international tribunal
proceedings, then the receptivity of the international tribunal is relevant.121
The fact that a foreign government is a party in that proceeding does not
mean that its receptivity to the request is relevant.
In other words, to the extent that comity is relevant to a Section 1782
analysis, it is relevant for balancing the interests of judicial coordination
between the ancillary federal court ordering discovery and the primary
foreign or international tribunal resolving the claim. This conclusion is
particularly important in the denial of justice context. To the extent
ancillary discovery is in aid of international proceedings adjudicating
questions of foreign judicial misconduct, there frequently will be both
foreign court and international tribunal proceedings. If the Section 1782
request is for use in both proceedings, then the receptivity of the
international tribunal and the foreign government will be relevant to any
determination whether to grant or deny an ancillary discovery request.122
But if the evidence is intended for use only in the international proceeding
to establish a denial of justice in a foreign proceeding, then the attitude of
the foreign government or a foreign court's receptivity to such discovery is
irrelevant.123
This conclusion follows from the nature and purpose of investment
arbitration. By signing a bilateral investment treaty, sovereigns invite
international tribunals to scrutinize their behavior. Therefore they do not
118. Id.
119. IntelCorp.v. Advanced Microdevices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004).
120. Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2004).
121. In re Chevron Corp., 749 F.Supp. 2d 141, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also In re Chevron Corp.,
2010 WL 4883111, at *3.
122. In re Application of Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 161-63 (3d Cir. 2011).
123. Id. at 161.
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expect an international tribunal to accord deference and respect to their
sovereign conduct, including the conduct of the judicial branch. It follows
that courts addressing Section 1782 discovery requests in aid of investment
arbitration will likewise consider the attitude of the international tribunal,
but not the attitude of the foreign sovereign responding to allegations of
judicial impropriety.
Of course, an international tribunal's receptivity is relevant to ancillary
discovery. Courts, however, neither give such receptivity dispositive
weight, nor do they give any weight to an international tribunal's silence. 124
Furthermore, courts have not followed the recommendation of some
influential commentators suggesting that, in the interest of judicial comity,
courts should limit Section 1782 discovery requests to only those issued or
approved by the international tribunal.125 Rather, courts liberally apply the
congressional policy of providing "equitable and efficacious procedures
for the benefit of tribunals and litigants."126 One might say that courts
remain skeptical of a broad application of judicial comity and take seriously
the "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdictional authority
granted to them under Section 1782.127 Thus far, international tribunals
have not objected to this method of ancillary discovery,128 and, at least in
the Chevron-Ecuador dispute, have used evidence gathered pursuant to
Section 1782 to issue orders and awards against Ecuador.129
B.

American-Style Discovery in InternationalProceedings

Through Section 1782, Congress has demonstrated a commitment to
facilitate ancillary discovery at home for proceedings abroad, and to do so
consistent with American understandings of the proper scope of
discovery. That style of discovery may be limited at the discretion of a
federal court, but the default rule is to treat ancillary discovery in aid of
foreign or international proceedings the same as any other type of
124. See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d at 163; In re Republic of Ecuador, No. 2:11-mc-00052
GSA, 2011 WL 4089189, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011); Beringer 709 F.Supp. 2d 283, 292 & n. 51
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Republic of Ecuador, Nos. C-10-80225 MISC CRB (EMC), C-10-80324 MISC
CRB (EMC), 2011 WL 736868, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011); In 1rChevron Corp., 762 F.Supp. 2d
242, 250-52 (D. Mass. 2010); In t Chevron Corp., Nos. 10-MC-208, 10-MC-209, 2010 WL 5173279,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2010); In reApplication of Ricardo Veiga, 746 F.Supp. 2d 8, 23-24 (D.D.C.
2010); In re Republic of Ecuador, 2010 WL 4027740, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010).
125. See, e.g., Committee on International Commercial Disputes of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, 28 U.S.C 5 1782 as a Means of Obtaining Discovery in Aid of International
Commercial Arbitration- Applicability and Best Practices, 63 THE RECORD 752, 778-79 (2008); BORN,
supra note 84, at 1935.
126. S.REP. No. 88-1580 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3793 (emphasis added).
127. Butf Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 393-94 (3d Cir. 2006).
128. See Chevron v. Camp, 2010 WL 3418394, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2010).
129. See Chevron v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Order for Interim Measures, 3-4 (Feb. 9,
2011); Chevron v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Interim Award, 16-19 (Jan. 25, 2012).
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discovery. In the exercise of their jurisdiction to facilitate ancillary
discovery, federal courts routinely apply this default approach consistent
with Congress' intent. The result is the indirect incorporation of
American-style discovery into foreign and international proceedings.
This liberal approach to discovery is particularly important for thirdparty discovery. In most cases third parties are beyond the reach of
international tribunals, and not surprisingly, third parties are the principal
target of Section 1782 discovery requests. In the denial of justice context,
the rise of Section 1782 affords investors a powerful tool to establish
allegations that a foreign judgment was procured by fraud. The litigant that
allegedly engaged in fraud in the foreign proceeding is not a party to the
international proceeding and therefore amenable to ancillary discovery
130
without offending the Intel discretionary factors.
American-style discovery in international proceedings has the obvious
potential for abuse. For example, in furtherance of its efforts to establish
that the Ecuadorian judgment was procured by fraud, Chevron reportedly
issued subpoenas to Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft to access almost a
decade of email logs of over 100 email addresses, including those with no
direct relationship to the dispute.131 Among the individuals whose email
logs were sought was an international law professor who blogs at Opinio
Juns and has no involvement in the case beyond critical commentary of
Chevron.132 Chevron maintains that the subpoenas are necessary to
determine whether the email accounts belong to key participants in the
dispute, while those subject to the subpoena allege that Chevron is trying
to harass and intimate its critics.133
As noted above, such liberal discovery runs counter to traditional
understandings of evidence gathering that have developed in international

130. To the extent an international tribunal has the authority to order third party discovery under
Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act, that power may undermine arguments that Section 1782
discovery is necessary. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 ("[A]rbitrators ... may summon ... any person to attend
before them ... as a witness and ... to bring with him or them any ... document ... which may be
deemed material as evidence in the case.'); BORN, supra note 84, at 1926-33 (discussing arbitral
tribunal authority under Section 7 to order testimony and document production, including by third
parties, in appropriate circumstances). If an arbitral tribunal has the authority to order third party
discovery, then the Inteldiscretionary factors may suggest that federal court assistance is unwarranted.
No court since Intel has addressed this relationship between Section 1782 and Section 7 of the FAA.
Because Section 7 only applies to arbitrations seated in the United States, the potential overlap
between Section 1782 and Section 7 does not apply for most ancillary discovery requests that have
been made in recent years, including all such requests in the Chevron-Ecuador context.
131. Declan McCullagh, Chermn Targets Google, Yahoo, Micmsoft E-mailAccounts, (Oct. 11, 2012, 3:05
PM), http://tinyurl.com/bhgpy49; David R. Baker, Chevron Seeks Email Logs in Ecuador Suit, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 1, 2012 available at http://tinyurl.com/9wh6b62.
132. Kevin Jon Heller, My Encounter nith a Chevron Subpoena- and the ACLU's Assistance (Updated),
29
(Sept. 28, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://tinyurl.com/9mt xu.
133. Id; Brian Hauss, Chevrmn Asks Email Pmviders to Hand Over Users' Private Information, (Oct. 5,
2012, 2:03 PM), http://tinyurl.com/am2f25r.
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proceedings. To the extent this trend is viewed with alarm, there are
opportunities to curtail it. The parties are free to incorporate discovery
limits in the arbitration agreement. This could be done expressly in the
contract or by incorporating such a limit in the arbitration rules. The LCIA
Arbitration Rules, for example, provide that "[b]y agreeing to arbitration
under these rules, the parties shall be treated as having agreed not to apply
to any state court or other judicial authority for any order available from
the Arbitral Tribunal ... except with the agreement in writing of all
parties." 34 Alternatively, the arbitral tribunal could impose such a limit in
procedural orders at the beginning of the arbitration. For example,
incorporating the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International
Arbitration as binding rules of evidence arguably would limit the freedom
to pursue third-party discovery without leave from the tribunal.s35 Finally,
if parties are abusing the Section 1782 process, an arbitral tribunal has the
36
authority to issue an order preventing such behavior.1
Of course, there is no assurance that a federal court will recognize any
such attempted limits on ancillary discovery. Although courts are
admonished to avoid granting a Section 1782 request that "conceal[s] an
attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions."l 37 This,
however, is but one of many factors under consideration when ordering
ancillary discovery.

C

Evidentiary Forum Shopping

Not surprisingly, the option of resorting to American-style discovery
has encouraged evidentiary forum shopping. Liberal discovery pursuant to
Section 1782 affords litigants an attractive alternative to the limited
discovery procedures available in international arbitration or foreign
litigation.
There are numerous examples of such forum shopping. Rather than rely
on the French courts to gather evidence of a French national pursuant to a
French proceeding, litigants serve him discovery requests while he is
visiting the United States.138 Rather than rely on the limited discovery

134. LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 22(2); BORN, supra note 84, at 1936.
135. INT'L. BAR Ass'N.

RULES ON

THE TAKING

OF

EVIDENCE IN

INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION, art. 3.9 (2010) ("If a Party wishes to obtain the production of Documents from a
person or organisation who is not a Party to the arbitration and from whom the Party cannot obtain
the Documents on its own, the Party may, within the time ordered by the Arbitral Tribunal, ask it to
take whatever steps are legally available to obtain the requested Documents, or seek leave from the
Arbitral Tribunal to take such steps itself.").
136. For a discussion of arbitrators as discovery gatekeepers, see Giacomo Rojas Elgueta,
Understanding DiscoveU in International Commenial Arbitration Throug/ Behanoral Lw and Economics: A
Journey Inside the Minds ofPartiesandArbitrators,16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 165, 180-91 (2011).
137. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Microdevices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 265 (2004).
138. In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2002).

152

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 53:127

available in German courts, a German plaintiff seeks millions of
documents from its American adversary under liberal American discovery
rules.139 Rather than seek emails that reveal fraud from a foreign account
holder, the alleged victim of fraud requests such emails from Google, the
domestic registrar of the email account. 140 Rather than examining
Chevron's expert witness pursuant to the procedures established under
international arbitration, Ecuador secures an order for the expert to
produce documents and submit to a deposition.141 Rather than waiting to
gather evidence from Ecuador in international arbitration, Chevron uses
the liberal standards of Section 1782 in an effort to gather evidence
directly from Ecuador.142 Of course, the Intel discretionary factors were
designed in part to prevent such behavior, but in most cases federal courts
have granted such discovery requests.
As discovery procedures in international arbitration crystallize toward a
hybrid model that adopts elements of civil law and common law discovery,
counsel - especially American counsel - will use the limits inherent in
the system to justify recourse to Section 1782 discovery. To the extent this
hybrid model of evidentiary standards is viewed as a jurisdictional limit on
the tribunal rather than a discovery restriction imposed on the parties,
there is no basis to argue that Section 1782 requests reflect an attempt to
circumvent proof-gathering restrictions. On the other hand, if these
evidentiary standards are viewed as limits on the power of parties to
pursue discovery by other means, then Section 1782 requests may
circumvent arbitral proof-gathering restrictions. 143
Evidentiary forum shopping is also evident in the choice of whom to
target for discovery. In the denial of justice context where there are
allegations that a judgment was procured by fraud, evidence of such fraud
could be procured either from a party to the investment arbitration, from
third parties, or both. In the Chevron-Ecuador dispute, for example, much
of the evidence Chevron sought could be procured from either
Ecuadorian judicial officials or the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and their
consultants who allegedly colluded with those officials. By opting to
discover such information from the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and consultants
rather than the Ecuadorian judiciary, Chevron engaged in a version of
evidentiary forum shopping. Chevron calculated that the payoffs of
Section 1782 discovery from the Ecuadorian plaintiffs would be greater
than the payoffs of arbitration discovery from the Ecuadorian judicial
139. Kulzer v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 2011).
140. In r Beluga Shipping GmbH & Co., 2010 WL 3749279 at *4-5.
141. In re Application of Ecuador, 2011 WL 4434816, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011); INT'L.
BAR Ass'N. RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION art. 5 (2010).

142. In reApplication of Ecuador, 2011 WL 736868, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011).
143. In re Application of Caratube Int'l Oil Co., 730 F.Supp. 2d 101, 105-07 (D.D.C. 2010);
BORN, smpra note 84, at 1935-36.
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officials. Given the scope and timing of such evidentiary payoffs, it is hard
to conclude otherwise.
There are legitimate concerns about transposing American discovery
into foreign and international proceedings. While Chevron's recourse to
ancillary discovery has been critical to advance its due process claims, this
approach has its disadvantages. The grafting of American discovery into
these proceedings increases costs and imposes delays. If left unchecked,
the Americanization of international arbitration or foreign litigation
through Section 1782 discovery could threaten to undermine many of the
perceived advantages of these alternative forums.
If the potential for abuse of ancillary discovery is obvious, the solution
is equally obvious. The ability to limit ancillary discovery is built into the
existing system at numerous levels. Federal courts have the statutory
discretion to limit discovery to that which is available in international
arbitration or foreign proceedings. 144 For example, the Supreme Court in
Intel ordered courts to exercise caution in granting ancillary discovery. In
addition, foreign courts are authorized to control discovery and impose
limits on the parties' fact-finding. International arbitrators are empowered
by existing arbitration rules to control discovery and regulate recourse to
ancillary discovery proceedings. Finally, the parties themselves may impose
contractual limits to circumscribe the scope of Section 1782 proceedings.
To the extent Chevron's approach becomes the norm rather than the
exception; greater control of evidentiary forum shopping may need to be
imposed. This could be done by altering the status quo, either through
amendments to arbitration institution rules that limit ancillary discovery, or
statutory amendments to Section 1782 that reverse the default
presumption of American-style discovery.

D.

Two-Level Games and Altering Incentives

Providing foreign investors with a remedy for denial of justice, together
with a robust means to prove such a violation, alters the host state's
behavioral incentives. In the typical denial of justice context where there is
judicial corruption or similar violations of fundamental due process, a state
often has an economic incentive to engage in such misconduct, whether
that incentive is to cancel a debt, justify illegal executive action, respond to
public preferences, or improperly adjudicate claims against foreigners for
the general welfare.145
A denial of justice claim imposes economic burdens on the state for
judicial impropriety. In a recent denial of justice claim against Ecuador, the
international tribunal ordered Ecuador to pay almost $700 million for the
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
145. See supra note 9-25 and accompanying text.
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Ecuadorian courts' failure to resolve claims that Chevron had against stateowned TexPet.146 In the current denial of justice claim that Chevron has
filed against Ecuador, if the tribunal determines there has been a denial of
justice, Ecuador could be required to pay to Chevron the equivalent
amount that Chevron is required to pay to the Ecuadorian plaintiffs
pursuant to the outstanding $18 billion judgment. By assigning costs on
the sovereign for the damage arising from a denial of justice, the sovereign
is induced to change its behavior, thereby enhancing the likelihood that the
sovereign will decide against inflicting future injury.'4 7
Ancillary discovery to establish a denial of justice is an important
component of this incentive structure. Creating an effective means to
establish evidence of judicial misconduct alters the risk-reward calculus of
a sovereign considering whether to deny foreign investors fundamental
due process. Mounting evidence of fraud enhances the likelihood of
success on the merits. Arguably, that is one of the reasons Chevron filed a
denial of justice claim in September 2009 as soon as evidence of alleged
corruption came to light, but before the Ecuadorian district court issued
the $18 billion Lago Agrio decision on the merits. Chevron is hoping - so
far unsuccessfully - to alter Ecuador's incentive calculus.
More broadly, the Chevron-Ecuador dispute illustrates the unusual
complexity of the two-level game in which the state tries to reconcile
domestic and international imperatives simultaneously. Moves that are
quite rational for Ecuador at the domestic level may be irrational at the
international level, and vice versa. At the national level, the Ecuadorian
government adopts policies and practices that satisfy domestic constituent
interests, such as rendering a dubious judgment that redistributes wealth
from a foreign corporation to millions of constituents. At the international
level, Ecuador seeks to minimize the adverse consequences of foreign
developments, such as the specter of an international arbitral award
ordering Ecuador to compensate Chevron for the billions it was
improperly required to pay to Ecuadorian plaintiffs. Two-level game
theory assumes that government decision-makers will strive to reconcile
domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.148 The filing of an
international arbitration claim alleging a denial of justice, combined with
discovery tools that effectively establish an international law violation,
requires the state to satisfy constituencies at both the domestic and
146. Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, Partial Award (Mar. 30, 2010), para.
550 availableat http://tinrurl.com/b54cc25.
147. See Roger P. Alford, ArbitraingHuman Rigbts, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 505, 527-28 (2008).
148. Robert D. Putnam, Diblomag and Domestic Poliirs: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L
ORG. 427, 434, 460 (1988). For a discussion applying two-level game theory to explain international
law compliance, see Joel Trachtman, InternaionalLaw and Domesic PoliticalCoaliions: The Grand Theog
of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 127, 153-55 (2010). For a discussion of
discovery and game theory, see Elgueta, supra note 136, at 177-78.

2012]1

ANCILLARY DISCOVERY

155

international levels, by pursuing paths that reconcile the international
obligation with the domestic political preference.
CONCLUSION
Section 1782 is a longstanding discovery tool that only recently is
receiving the attention it deserves. There is every reason to believe that
recourse to such ancillary discovery will continue to grow in the coming
years. Prior to Intel, the statute was of modest importance, utilized in
approximately two cases per year.149 Since Intel, there has been a veritable
explosion in ancillary discovery requests, with twice as many federal court
decisions addressing Section 1782 requests in the past eight years as there
were in the forty years prior.150 Interpreting the statute to apply to
international arbitration has greatly expanded the opportunities for Section
1782 discovery. The rise of ancillary discovery in aid of international
arbitration will follow from the growth of such arbitration. 15' Many of
these will afford ample opportunity to pursue ancillary discovery.
This growth also portends growing scholarly interest in the subject.
Currently there is precious little scholarship regarding ancillary discovery
under Section 1782,152 and none addressing ancillary discovery in aid of
investment arbitration. As I have suggested in this article, ancillary
discovery to prove a denial of justice claim raises special concerns that
merit serious reflection.
149. Based on a Westlaw search of cases from 1964, when the statute was amended, to 2004,
when Intel was decided, there have been 94 reported cases addressing Section 1782 requests in forty
years.
150. Based on Westlaw search there have been 190 reported Section 1782 cases since Intelwas
decided in 2004, and a majority of those were reported in the past three years.
151. According to the World Bank, there are 163 pending investment arbitration cases currently
administered under ICSID procedures. ICSID PENDING CASES, http://tinyurl.com/c6bqzbh (last
visited Nov. 15, 2012). The ICC reported almost 800 requests for international commercial
arbitration in 2010, and surveys of the major arbitration institutions identify over 3,000 international
2010 STATISTICAL
arbitrations filed every year. FACTS AND FIGURES ON ICC ARBITRATION REPORT, available at http://tinyurl.com/b7ndgxd; QUEEN MARY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION INSTITUTIONS/STATSTICS, availableat http://tinyurl.com/baeujr4.

152. See, e.g., Alan Rau, Evidence and Discoveg in American Arbitration: The Problem of "Third Parties,"
19 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 28-39 (2008); Paul R. Dubinsky, Is TransnaionalLitigation a DistinctField?
The Persistence of Exceptionalism in American ProceduralLaw, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 301, 334-41 (2008). To
the extent there is commentary, almost all of it is limited to practitioner articles or student notes. See,
e.g., Kenneth Beale et al., Solving the f 1782 PuoRle: Bringing Certainty to the Debate over 28 U.S.C § 1782's
Application to InternationalArbitration, 47 STAN. J. INT'L L. 51, 67-89 (2011); Jenna M. Godfrey,
Comment, Americanization of Discovery: Why StatutoU InterpretationBars 28 U.S.C § I782(a)'s Application
in PrivateInternationalArbitrationProceedings, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 475, 492-98 (2010); Marat A. Massen,
Discovey for Foreign Proceedings After Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices: A Critical Analysis of 28 U.S. C
g 1782 Juriprudence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 875 (2019); Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga, The Future of 28 U.S.C
f 1782: The Continued Advance ofAmerican-Style Discovey in International Commercial Arbitration, 64 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 89 (2009); Daniel J. Rothstein, A Proposalto Clariy U.S. Lai on judicial Assistance in
Taking Evidencefor InternationalArbitration,19 AMER. REV. INT'L ARB. 61, 61-89 (2008).
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Fortunately, the Chevron-Ecuador dispute has greatly enhanced the
public profile of ancillary discovery under Section 1782, with the past two
years witnessing the greatest recourse to ancillary discovery in the statute's
history. The Chevron-Ecuador dispute could prove to be a watershed
event in the history of the statute, including scholarly analysis of the use of
American-style discovery in aid of foreign and international proceedings.

